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CASENOTES
TORTS - MEDICAL MALPRACTICE - COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND ADOPTS DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CON-
SENT. SARD v. HARDY, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977).
Maryland has long recognized that a physician treating a
mentally competent patient in a non-emergency situation must
obtain the patient's consent prior to undertaking any treatment.' In
Sard v. Hardy,2 the Court of Appeals of Maryland expressly
adopted 3 the doctrine of informed consent as a theory of recovery for
medical malpractice, even in the absence of negligent performance. 4
1. See McLees v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60, 62-63, 148 A. 124, 126 (1930); Powell, Consent
to Operative Procedures, 21 MD. L. REV. 189 (1961).
2. 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977).
3. The informed consent principle was tacitly recognized by the court of appeals in
Kruszewski v. Holtz, 265 Md. 434, 290 A.2d 535 (1972). That case was decided on
purely procedural grounds, and the court was not called upon to determine the
very existence of the informed consent doctrine in Maryland. The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant-physician had failed to inform her adequately of the
inherent risks in, and the alternatives to, a hysterectomy. The court of appeals
limited its holding to finding that the form of hypothetical questions addressed
to the defendant's expert witness, which sought to establish the applicable
standard of care for the defendant's medical community, were proper since they
were based upon either uncontradicted facts or assumptions of certain facts as
true. Id. at 444-45, 290 A.2d at 540.
4. 281 Md. at 439, 379 A.2d at 1019. The informed consent doctrine is rooted in the
principle of law aptly stated by Justice Cardozo, that
[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient's consent, commits an assault,
for which he is liable in damages. This is true except in cases of
emergency where the patient is unconscious and where it is necessary to
operate before consent can be obtained.
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92,
93 (1914).
Shortly after the Schloendorff decision, courts began to rule that a patient's
consent to a proposed course of treatment was valid only to the extent the patient
was informed by the physician as to what was to be done, the risk involved, and
the alternatives to the proposed treatment. Cf. Hunter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. 113,
96 S.E. 360 (1918). In Hunter, the Virginia court found sufficient evidence of
negligent treatment to support a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, but
discussed, in dicta, the physician's failure to disclose the risks inherent in x-ray
therapy for eczema. Id. at 133-34, 96 S.E. at 366-67. The informed consent
principle remained relatively dormant for a number of years.
The last two decades, however, have yielded a flood of decisions and
commentary on the informed consent issue. See cases collected in Annot., 79
A.L.R.2d 1028 (1961) and representative commentaries in McCoid, The Care
Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549 (1959); Myers, Informed
Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1396 (1967); Plante, An
Analysis of Informed Consent, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 639 (1968); Waltz and
Schueneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 628 (1970); Note,
Informed Consent Liability, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 696 (1976); Note, Failure to Inform
as Medical Malpractice, 23 VAND. L. REV. 754 (1970). See generally A. HOLDER,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW at 225-65 (2d ed. 1978).
The court of appeals adopted the generally accepted informed consent rule:
[T]he doctrine of informed consent imposes on a physician, before he
subjects his patient to medical treatment, the duty to explain the
procedures to the patient and to warn him of any material risks or
dangers inherent in or collateral to the therapy, so as to enable the
Sard v. Hardy
The court in Sard imposed upon physicians a duty to explain all
contemplated procedures to the patient and to warn him of any
material risks inherent in the proposed treatment prior to obtaining
the patient's consent. 5
This Casenote discusses the Sard decision, with particular
emphasis on the practical application of the opinion to informed
consent cases from both the patient's and physician's perspective.
The court of appeals's delineation of the doctrine will be compared
with the position adopted by other jurisdictions embracing the
informed consent concept by analyzing three major areas of dispute:
first, the scope of the physician's duty to warn his patient and the
appropriate test for its measure; second, the role of expert testimony
in the presentation of the plaintiffs and defendant's case; and
finally, the appropriate test for determining causation between the
physician's failure to disclose a particular risk and the injury
claimed by his patient.
I. SARD v. HARDY - THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND
While pregnant with her second child, Katie Sard consulted Dr.
Erving Hardy, a specialist in obstetrics and gynecology. Mrs. Sard's
first pregnancy had been a difficult one, terminating in the
premature Caesarean delivery of a stillborn child. 6 Her second
pregnancy resulted in the Caesarean delivery of a healthy baby.
When Mrs. Sard became pregnant for the third time, Dr. Hardy
again supervised her prenatal care. In light of Mrs. Sard's prior
medical difficulties during pregnancy and her assertion that she did
not want any more children, the possibility of preventing future
conception was discussed.7 Dr. Hardy offered three options: steriliza-
patient to make an intelligent and informed choice about whether or not
to undergo such treatment.
281 Md. at 439, 379 A.2d at 1020.
5. 281 Md. at 433-34, 379 A.2d at 1022. The court also adopted the prevailing view
that the physician's violation of this duty is properly cast as a tort action for
negligerice, as opposed to battery or assault. 281 Md. at 440 n.4, 379 A.2d at 1020
n.4 (citing Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972)).
But see Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 (1965), modified on other
grounds, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966) (surgery performed without a
patient's informed consent is a battery). For a discussion of the varying
requirements under the two theories, see Plante, An Analysis of Informed
Consent, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 639 (1968).
6. 281 Md. at 435, 379 A.2d at 1017-18. Mrs. Sard suffered from a dangerous
condition known as eclampsia, which is the occurrence of one or more
convulsions in a patient with preeclampsia. Preeclampsia is the development of
hypertension due to pregnancy. As a consequence, Mrs. Sard experienced a series
of convulsions, which necessitated the premature Caesarean delivery of her
child. Id.
7. 281 Md. at 436, 379 A.2d at 1018. Though Dr. Hardy denied at trial having
warned Mrs. Sard that a future pregnancy might imperil her health, he did sign
a consultant's report that stated in part, "[t]he patient has been personally
examined by me and I feel that future pregnancies would endanger her life.
Sterilization is recommended for the following [sic] reason." Id.
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tion, oral contraception, or the use of an intrauterine device.8 Mrs.
Sard chose sterilization by means of a tubal ligation, to be done at
the time of Caesarean section. 9
Dr. Hardy failed to inform Mrs. Sard of the various methods of
performing a tubal ligation and their respective failure rates. 10 The
failure rates for the various tubal ligation procedures" ranged from
two percent to less than .1 percent. 12 Dr. Hardy neglected to inform
Mrs. Sard that the technique used had a two percent failure rate
when performed at the time of Caesarean delivery and that its risks
diminished significantly when performed at some time other than
Caesarean birth. 3 Denied this information, Mrs. Sard signed a
standard hospital consent form indicating her consent to the
sterilization. 4
Despite the performance of a tubal ligation in conjunction with
the Caesarean delivery of her third child, Mrs. Sard became
pregnant for a fourth time and delivered a healthy baby. Subse-
quently, Mrs. Sard brought suit alleging, inter alia,15 that Dr. Hardy
8. 281 Md. at 436, 379 A.2d at 1018. "Mrs. Sard's husband testified that [Dr. Hardy]
never mentioned the possibility of vasectomy. Although unable to recall whether
he had mentioned this alternative . Dr. Hardy testified that generally it was
his practice to do so." Id.
9. 281 Md. at 436, 379 A.2d at 1018.
10. "[Dr. Hardy] further testified that it was good medical practice for a physician
merely to inform the patient of the fact that a tubal ligation was to be done
without discussing the details of the surgical procedures necessary to accomplish
sterilization." 281 Md. at 436-37, 379 A.2d at 1018. Dr. Hardy testified that the
final choice as to which of the various techniques should be employed was
generally made by the surgeon after incision and examination of the uterus. Id.
at 437, 379 A.2d at 1018.
11. The evidence at trial indicated that there were essentially six methods employed
in the United states to effectuate sterilization by tubal ligation: the Madlener and
Pomeroy techniques, and the Irving, Uchida, Aldridge, and Erlich methods. 281
Md. at 437, 379 A.2d at 1018. The method used by Dr. Hardy on Mrs. Sard was
the Madlener technique. Id.
12. Id. at 437, 379 A.2d at 1018.
13. Id. In fact, the failure rates for all of the tubal ligation procedures diminished
dramatically when performed at some time other than Caesarean birth. Id.
14. Id. at 437-38, 379 A.2d at 1019. The consent form provided, in part: "I/We
understand what is meant by sterilization and I/We understand that if this
operation is successful, the above named patient will be unable in the future to
produce children, but I/We understand that an operation intended to effect
sterilization is not effective in all cases."
The trial court, in directing a verdict in favor of Dr. Hardy, held that the
informed consent issue was conclusively settled against Mrs. Sard, since, by
signing the consent form, she had acknowledged her understanding that the
sterilization procedure was not effective in all cases. The court of appeals,
however, gave little effect to the consent form. Instead, the court relegated the
issue to a footnote, and stated that the consent form issue must be governed by
the same principles used in evaluating Mrs. Sard's informed consent claim
generally. Id. at 438 n.3, 379 A.2d at 1019 n.3. Thus, the court continued, unless
the patient was adequately apprised of the material risks and therapeutic
alternatives, the written consent is just as ineffectual as an oral one.
15. The plaintiffs amended declaration set forth a total of eight causes of action
based upon informed consent, negligence in the actual performance of the
116 [Vol. 8
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had failed to adequately inform her about the alternative methods of
performing a tubal ligation and the failure rates attendant in each.
Mrs. Sard claimed that her consent to the operation was not
informed and therefore ineffectual. 16 The trial court granted a
directed verdict in favor of the defendant, Dr. Hardy, from which
Mrs. Sard appealed. 7
The court of special appeals adopted the doctrine of informed
consent, stating that a physician is under a duty to make an
adequate disclosure to his patient of substantial facts that would be
material to the patient's decision whether to consent to a proposed
operation. 18 In affirming the directed verdict, the court held, as a
matter of law, that the two percent risk of failure inherent in the
sterilization operation, and breach of express warranty. The negligence counts
were not pursued by Sard on appeal.
Mrs. Sard's warranty claim relied upon assurances allegedly made by Dr.
Hardy both before and after the operation. Sard testified that Dr. Hardy had
affirmatively assured her before the operation that she would not be having any
more children, 281 Md. at 437, 379 A.2d at 1018-19, and reassured her after the
operation that she could engage in sexual intercourse without fear of future
pregnancies. Id. at 452 n.6, 379 A.2d at 1026 n.6. The court of special appeals, in
upholding the directed verdict on Mrs. Sard's warranty claim, held that "an
alleged express warranty cannot be enforced unless, (1) it was made before the
operation was performed, and was relied upon by the patient in contracting for
the service, or (2) it was supported by a separate consideration." Sard v. Hardy,
34 Md. App. 217, 239, 367 A.2d 525, 537 (1976).
The court of appeals, in affirming the rule as formulated by the court of
special appeals, agreed that proof of separate consideration is required only
when the alleged warranty is made post-operatively. 281 Md. at 452, 379 A.2d at
1026. Since there was no evidence that Dr. Hardy received a separate
consideration to support liability for the alleged post-operative warranty, the
trial court properly directed a verdict in favor of the physician on that issue. 281
Md. at 452 n.6, 379 A-2d at 1026 n.6. When the warranty is made prior to the
surgery or treatment, however, proof of separate consideration is not required,
and the patient may recover in contract by proving breach of an express
warranty. 281 Md. at 452, 379 A.2d at 1026-27 (citing Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363
Mass. 579, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1973); Guilmet v. Campbell, 385 Mich. 57, 67 n.1, 188
N.W.2d 601, 605 n.1 (1971)). But see Rogala v. Silva, 16 Ill. App. 3d 63, 65, 305
N.E.2d 571, 574 (1973) (any liability against a physician founded on breach of
express warranty requires proof of separate consideration).
Though separate consideration was not required, Mrs. Sard could recover for
breach of an express pre-operative warranty only upon clear and convincing
evidence that Dr. Hardy did, in fact, make the alleged warranty. 281 Md. at 453,
379 A.2d at 1027. The court stressed that a physician is not an insurer of the
success of his treatment and distinguished between a good faith prediction of a
particular outcome and a guarantee that he will effect a given result. Id. at
451-52, 379 A.2d at 1026. In the instant case, the court held that the bald
statement attributed to Dr. Hardy that Mrs. Sard would not have any more
children after the operation did not rise to the level of a guarantee. Id. at 453-54,
379 A.2d at 1027. Instead, it was at best a mere hopeful expression of opinion or
prediction of an expected result, and the trial court acted properly in directing a
verdict for Dr. Hardy on the express warranty claims. Id. at 454, 379 A.2d at
1027.
16. 281 Md. at 435, 379 A.2d at 1017.
17. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
18. Sard v. Hardy, 34 Md. App. 217, 231, 367 A.2d 525, 533 (1976).
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Madlener technique would not be material to a reasonable person in
deciding whether to consent to sterilization.' 9
The court of appeals reversed, holding that sufficient evidence
was presented to require a jury determination of whether the
information withheld by Dr. Hardy was material to Mrs. Sard's
consent.20 The court defined a material risk as "one which a
physician knows or ought to know would be significant to a
reasonable person in the patient's position in deciding whether or
not to submit to a particular medical treatment or procedure." 21 The
court noted that evidence was presented indicating that Mrs. Sard
was concerned about the possibility of serious damage to her health
and the financial burden involved in raising another child. 22 In
addition, Mrs. Sard testified that Dr. Hardy had affirmatively
represented before the operation that she would not become pregnant
after the sterilization. Given these facts, the court reasoned that a
jury could have found that the projected failure rates for the various
procedures would be significant to a reasonable person in Mrs.
Sard's position in deciding whether to consent to a particular
sterilization procedure. 2' Remanding the case for a new trial, the
court of appeals provided specific guidelines for the conduct of future
19. Id. at 234-35, 367 A.2d at 535. Judge Davidson, in her dissenting opinion, found
that Mrs. Sard's primary concern was not having any more children. Viewing
this evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Judge Davidson
believed that this testimony supported the inference that had Mrs. Sard been told
of the possibility of failure she would have rejected the operation. Id. at 253, 367
A.2d at 545 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
20. 281 Md. at 446, 379 A.2d at 1023.
21. Id. at 444, 379 A.2d at 1022. One potential source of confusion in the court's
definition of materiality is the question of whether a physician is under a duty to
disclose risks which he believes would be significant to the individual patient but
which a reasonable patient would not consider significant. Such a situation may
arise when the doctor and patient have enjoyed a long-term, professional
relationship whereby the physician knows many of the individual, though
unreasonable, concerns of his patient. The patient may, for example, be
concerned about minor cosmetic damage in major surgery, which a reasonable
patient in the position requiring such surgery would not consider important, in
deciding whether to submit to the proposed treatment. It is not clear from the
court of appeals's opinion whether "significant to a reasonable person in the
patient's position" refers solely to those risks which all reasonable persons
requiring a particular treatment would consider significant or instead, includes
risks which would be significant only to a reasonable patient with a known
individual concern.
The better interpretation is that the physician is not under a duty to disclose
those risks that are significant only to the individual patient. The Sard court
implied as much by stating, "[olnce the physician has ascertained the risks and
alternatives, and has communicated this information to the patient, it is the
patient's exclusive right to weigh these risks together with his individual
subjective fears and hopes and to determine whether or not to place his body in
the hands of the surgeon or physician." 281 Md. at 443, 379 A.2d at 1021. Purely
individual predilictions, it would seem, are to be balanced against the risks by
the patient, and not by the physician in deciding the materiality of a particular
risk.




medical practitioner of the same specialty would adhere to in the
same or similar circumstances. 25
II. THE PHYSICIAN'S DUTY TO DISCLOSE INFORMATION
TO HIS PATIENT
In malpractice actions involving the negligent administration of
treatment or negligent performance of a procedure, the physician's
duty of care is based on a professional standard.24 The doctor's duty
is to conform to the standard of care that a reasonably competent
medical practitioner of the same specialty would adhere to in the
same or similar circumstances. 25
Most of the early informed consent cases utilized the profes-
sional standard and held that the plaintiff must prove that the
doctor departed from the accepted medical standards of disclosure. 26
Thus, the measure of liability in all medical malpractice cases was
the same.
The justification generally offered for defining the physician's
disclosure duty in terms of the professional standard was expressed
by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Aiken v. Clary.27 The Aiken
court reasoned that the question of what risks should be disclosed by
a physician necessarily demands consideration of the patient's
overall health and mental state.28 Since these factors involve the
exercise of professional medical judgment, a failure to disclose risks
becomes potentially compensable 29 only if a reasonable medical
practitioner under the same or similar circumstances would have
made the disclosure.30 The plaintiff in Aiken, having failed to offer
any evidence as to what a reasonably prudent physician would have
24. "[While] the conduct of the average layman charged with negligence is evaluated
in terms of the hypothetical conduct of a reasonably prudent person acting under
the same or similar circumstances, the standard applied in medical malpractice
cases must also take into account the specialized knowledge or skill of the
defendant." Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hospital Ass'n, 276 Md. 187,
190-91, 349 A.2d 245, 247 (1975). See W. PROSSER, Torts §32 (4th ed. 1971);
McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 558
(1959).
25. Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hospital Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 191-92, 349 A.2d
245, 251 (1975); Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370, 372-73 (Ky. 1970). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
26. See, e.g., Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 (1965), modified on
other grounds, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan.
393, 350 P.2d 1093, reh. denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960); Roberts v.
Young, 369 Mich. 133, 119 N.W.2d 627 (1963); Starnes v. Taylor, 272 N.C. 386, 158
S.E.2d 339 (1968).
27. 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965) (physician failed to adequately disclose the risks
inherent in the administration of insulin shock therapy).
28. Id. at 674.
29. The physician's breach of his disclosure duty results in liability only if the
patient can establish that such a breach was the proximate cause of the injury
suffered. See text accompanying notes 77-87 infra.
30. Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Mo. 1965).
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disclosed to a patient about to undergo insulin shock therapy, 31 was
foreclosed from recovery.
Similarly, in Natanson v. Kline,3 2 the Supreme Court of Kansas
adopted the professional standard of care, reasoning that such a
standard adequately protects the patient's interests because of the
medical profession's recognition of its obligation to maintain a high
standard of professional care. 33 The court apparently assumed that
the medical community as a whole would voluntarily disclose
pertinent information to the patient, recognizing the patient's right
of self-determination. Such total deference, as in Natanson, to the
internal standards of the medical profession is subject to question. 34
31. Id.
32. 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, reh. denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
33. Id. at 411, 350 P.2d at 1107.
34. The record before the Natanson court indicated that the defendant Kline made
no disclosures to his patient whatsoever prior to the administration of radiation
therapy. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. at 410, 350 P.2d at 1106. The rule of law
formulated by the court appears uniquely hybrid in nature:
[The informed consent] rule in effect compels disclosure by the physician
in order to assure that an informed consent of the patient is obtained.
The duty of the physician to disclose, however, is limited to those
disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner would make under
the same or similar circumstances. How the physician may best
discharge his obligation to the patient. . . involves primarily a question
of medical judgment. So long as the disclosure is sufficient to assure an
informed consent, the physician's choice of plausible courses should not
be called into question if it appears ... that the physician was
motivated only by the patient's best therapeutic interests and he
proceeded as competent medical men would have done in a similar
situation.
Id. at 409-10, 350 P.2d at 1106. Once a minimum level of disclosure is attained,
the professional standard controls. This is difficult to reconcile with the court's
assertion that the medical profession's internal standards adequately protect the
patient, Id. at 411, 350 P.2d at 1107, since the medical standards may fail to meet
the minimum level of disclosure. The court remanded for a new trial due to
erroneous instructions and suggested a modified instruction that informs thejury that a physician has such discretion, as above indicated, "consistent with
the full disclosure of facts necessary to assure an informed consent by the
patient." Id. at 411, 350 P.2d at 1107.
On the defendant's motion for rehearing, the Supreme Court of Kansas
rejected the contention that an absolute duty of disclosure had been imposed
without regard to the disclosures that a reasonable medical practitioner would
make under the same or similar circumstances. Natanson v. Kline, 187 Kan. 186,
354 P.2d 670 (1960). Instead, the court re-emphasized that Dr. Kline made no
disclosures whatever in a non-emergency situation, and stated, "[o]n this state of
the record Dr. Kline failed in his legal duty to make a reasonable disclosure to
the appellant who was his patient as a matter of law." Id. at 189, 354 P.2d at 673
(emphasis in original). No expert testimony was required to show that Dr. Kline's
failure was contrary to accepted medical practice. Id. The door was left ajar,
however, by the court's concession that no disclosure may be justified where such
practice, under given facts and circumstances, is established by expert testimony
to be in accordance with that of a reasonable medical practitioner under the
same or similar circumstances. Id. In sum, the court's position seems to be that
no disclosure at all is presumptively negligent, but the presumption may be
overcome where expert testimony establishes such a practice to be medically
reasonable under the circumstances. The court has come back full circle to the
120 [Vol. 8
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Other decisions have recognized that the standard of care formu-
lated within a given profession may itself be inadequate and that
blind adherence to the customary practice will not be sufficient to
relieve a defendant from liability.35
Though still the majority rule, 36 the professional standard for
determining the scope of the physician's duty to disclose risk
information has come under increasing attack. 37 In Sard, the court
of appeals aligned itself with a growing minority of jurisdictions
that define the physician's duty in terms of a general standard of
reasonableness measured by the materiality of the information to
the patient.38 Under this standard, whether the disclosure would
have been made by a reasonably competent physician under the
same or similar circumstances is not dispositive of the issue of
original problem, that is, the patient's dilemma when the medical practice is to
remain totally silent.
Further explanation of the Kansas position was forthcoming in Collins v.
Meeker, 198 Kan. 390, 424 P.2d 488 (1967). The plaintiff alleged a failure on the
part of two physicians, Dr. Meeker and Dr. Mastio, to inform Collins of the risks
inherent in hernia operations performed a year apart. Id. at 392-93, 424 P.2d at
492. The court's application of Natanson to the two defendants clarified
Natanson's scope, but left the patient's dilemma unsolved.
The record revealed that Dr. Meeker did not disclose the possible adverse
effects that might follow a hernia operation. Id. at 397-98, 424 P.2d at 495.
Therefore, the court held, the plaintiff was not required to present expert
evidence to establish a violation of Meeker's disclosure duty and reversed the
summary judgment entered in favor of Meeker. Id. at 398, 424 P.2d at 495. Even
though the plaintiff was relieved of the burden of showing, by expert evidence,
that his doctor's silence deviated from acceptable medical practice, there was
nothing in the Natanson rule that precluded the doctor from showing that his
silence did in fact comply with medical standards under the facts then facing
him. Id. at 397, 424 P.2d at 494-95.
As to the defendant Mastio, there was uncontradicted evidence that some
risk disclosure was made. Id. at 398, 424 P.2d at 495. Since the disclosures would
have to be ascertained by the trier of fact, Natanson required expert medical
testimony to establish that the disclosures made did not accord with those which
reasonable medical practitioners would divulge under the same or like
circumstances. Id.
35. See, e.g., Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 299, 282 A.2d 206, 217 (1971). In an
action for the negligent administration of antibiotic drugs, the court quoted
Justice Holmes: "What usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done,
but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether
it is usually complied with or not." Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 189
U.S. 468, 470 (1903).
36. See Note, Informed Consent Liability, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 696, 702-04 (1976), and
accompanying footnotes for a collection of majority and minority view cases.
37. The most universally voiced criticism of the professional standard is that it
endows the medical profession with virtually absolute discretion in fixing the
standard for adequate disclosure. The Supreme Court of California has found
this discretion "irreconcilable with the basic right of the patient to make the
ultimate informed decision regarding the course of treatment to which he
knowledgeably consents to be subjected." Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502
P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972). See Myers, Informed Consent in Medical
Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1396, 1404 (1967); Note, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1445,
1447 (1962).
38. 281 Md. at 443-44, 379 A.2d at 1022.
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liability.39 Instead, the physician's duty to disclose is based upon
what the patient needs to know in order to make an intelligent
decision concerning proposed treatment.40
The trend toward defining a physician's duty to disclose by
considering the patient's "need to know" was hastened by several
influential 1972 decisions. 41 In Canterbury v. Spence,42 for example,
a physician failed to warn his patient of the one percent risk of
paralysis in a laminectomy, a surgical procedure utilized to correct a
ruptured disc. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
conceded that a physician's departure from professional custom
may, like any other departure from prevailing medical practice, give
rise to liability, but found that a cause of action under the informed
consent doctrine is not dependent upon the existence and nonperfor-
mance of a professional custom. 43 While recognizing that the
physician's professional expertise may make the appropriate course
of action obvious to him, the court stated, "it is the prerogative of the
patient, not the physician, to determine for himself the direction in
which his interests seem to lie." 44 The court further reasoned that the
duty to disclose "arises from phenomena apart from medical custom
and practice, [thus a] definition of scope in terms purely of a
professional standard is at odds with the patient's prerogative to
decide on projected therapy himself. '45 Accordingly, the Canterbury
court adopted a reasonable man standard, holding that the
physician is obligated to disclose those risks which may be material
to the patient's decision concerning suggested treatment.46 A risk
was held to be material "when a reasonable person, in what the
physician knows or should know to be the patient's position, would
be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in
deciding whether or not to forego the proposed therapy.''47
The court of special appeals followed the Canterbury analysis by
defining the required scope of disclosure in terms of the informa-
tion's materiality to the patient,48 a position affirmed by the court of
appeals.49 Where the court of appeals disagreed was in the
application of that standard to the facts of the Sard case. The court
of special appeals failed to consider adequately the evidence pre-
sented at trial concerning the alternative methods of performing a
39. Id.
40. Id. at 442, 379 A.2d at 1021.
41. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Wilkinson v.
Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
42. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
43. Id. at 783.
44. Id. at 781.
45. Id. at 786.
46. Id. at 787.
47. Id.
48. Sard v. Hardy, 34'Md. App. 217, 231, 367 A.2d 525, 533 (1976).
49. Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 445, 379 A.2d 1014, 1023 (1977).
122 [Vol. 8
Sard v. Hardy
tubal ligation that were available to Dr. Hardy and the failure rates
for each. Instead, the court relied upon evidence showing that no
physical harm came to Mrs. Sard and that the operation had a
ninety-eight percent chance of success.5° The court of special appeals
emphasized the probability of success in the Madlener technique
rather than the possibility of failure. On that basis, the court held, as
a matter of law, that the withheld information was not material
because a reasonable person would not have considered the two
percent failure rate significant.5 '
The court of appeals, however, placed greater import on the
evidence indicating that not only did Dr. Hardy neglect to inform
Mrs. Sard of the failure potential in the Madlener technique, but that
he also neglected to advise her of the available, alternative
sterilization methods and their lower failure rates. If the Madlener
technique had been the only means of performing a tubal ligation,
the court of special appeals's position would have been more tenable.
In such a case, a reasonable person with the objective of avoiding
future pregnancy might not have found the one chance in fifty that
the operation might fail significant.5 2 Where more effective proce-
dures are readily available, however, a reasonable person might
have found the chances of success in each significant in deciding
which procedure to select. The court of appeals's decision was based
upon Dr. Hardy's nondisclosure of available alternatives. Because
Dr. Hardy knew that Mrs. Sard's primary objective was to eliminate
the possibility of future pregnancy, he should have recognized that a
reasonable patient in that position would find the chances of success
in various procedures significant to the patient's decision.
The materiality standard adopted in Sard is not without limits.
"The physician need not deliver a 'lengthy polysyllabic discourse on
all possible complications. A mini-course in medical science is not
required.' "53 Only those risks that are material to the informed
decision of a reasonably prudent patient need be disclosed s4 Even
with this basic limitation on the physician's duty, the materiality
test adopted in Sard is preferable to the professional standard of
care. Under the materiality standard, due consideration is given to
the self-determination interests of the patient55 while still allowing
for the exercise of valid medical judgment in deciding whether
disclosure is warranted in a particular case. The court of appeals
50. Sard v. Hardy, 34 Md. App. at 234-35, 367 A.2d at 535.
51. Id.
52. This is assuming, of course, that the threshhold decision to submit to a tubal
ligation of some type, as opposed to a vasectomy or oral contraceptives, was
informed.
53. 281 Md. at 444, 379 A.2d at 1022 (quoting Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 244, 502
P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972)).
54. 281 Md. at 444, 379 A.2d at 1022.
55. But cf. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 409, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106, reh. denied, 187
Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
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noted that, in certain circumstances, there would be exceptions to
full disclosure. A qualified privilege to withhold material facts from
the patient exists in a number of situations. Such a privilege exists
where disclosure would have a detrimental physical or psychological
effect,56 in instances of the patient's mental disability or infancy,57
or where the patient himself has suggested that such facts not be
disclosed to him. The privilege also exists in cases of emergency 58 or
where the material risk is an obvious feature of the proposed
treatment.59 Low incident risks which are inherent in common
procedures and are commonly known to exist need not be disclosed
by the attending physician. Finally, since the degree of medical
knowledge is constantly expanding, the physician is not under a
duty to disclose risks that would not have been known to him by the
exercise of ordinary care.6° These medical judgnient considerations
are matters of affirmative defense to be presented by the physician.61
56. Id. There may be cases when full and total disclosure of risks could so alarm the
patient that it would constitute bad medical practice. Id. at 406, 350 P.2d at 1103.
57. Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. at 445, 379 A.2d at 1022.
The procedure to be followed by physicians when a patient lacks the mental
or physical capacity to give a legally valid informed consent is unclear. Under
Maryland law, a person is presumed competent, even if institutionalized, MD.
ANN. CODE art. 59, § 51 (1972) (civil rights of patients); art. 59A, § 35 (Supp. 1977)
(civil rights of mentally retarded persons), unless after proper notice and
hearing, he is judicially declared to have a mental disorder, MD. ANN. CODE art.
59, §§ 12, 13 (1972 & Supp. 1977) and a guardian is appointed MD. EST. & TRUSTS
CODE ANN. § 13-704 (1974). Because of the delays often inherent in the judicial
hearing process, physicians may be forced to obtain substitute consent from a
patient's family rather than waiting for a judicial determination of competency.
In an attempt to clarify the role of the physician, patient, patient's family,
and substitute decision-maker, the Maryland General Assembly, in 1979, will
consider a Health Care Procedures-Consent Bill. This bill, introduced in the 1977
session as Senate Bill 734, was debated and defeated on the Senate floor by a
vote of 21 to 20. A key provision of the bill is the establishment of a state-wide
system of Substitute Consent Review Boards that would make an initial
determination of capacity to give informed consent and, when necessary, appoint
an appropriate substitute decision-maker. The hope is that the Review Boards
will expedite the appointment of necessary guardians and provide for more
informed competency determinations.
For an analysis of the Health Care Procedures-Consent Bill, see Shuger &
Somerville, The Informed Consent Dilemma: A Legislative Solution, Summer
1978 MD. B.J. 25.
58. Id. These exceptions to the physician's disclosure duty are actually limits on the
physician's general duty to obtain the patient's consent prior to treating his
patient. If there is no need to obtain any consent, it is obvious that any risk
disclosure would be superfluous. For consent exceptions, see generally Powell,
Consent to Operative Procedures, 21 MD. L. REV. 189, 199-203, 207-18 (1961).
59. Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. at 445, 379 A.2d at 1022. One example would be the risk
of infection. See Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich. 133, 137-38, 119 N.W.2d 627, 629
(1963).
60. Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. at 445, 379 A.2d at 1022-23. See Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58
Wis. 2d 569, 604, 207 N.W.2d 297, 315 (1973) (overwhelming evidence that
reasonably competent physicians were unaware of the risk of hepatitis from the
administration of the drug isoniazid hydrazate (INH) for treatment of an
inactive TB condition).




The practical effect of the materiality test is that the plaintiff is
not required to prove that prevailing medical practice justified
nondisclosure. 62 Requiring the physician to present evidence of those
medical considerations that may justify nondisclosure is preferable
to requiring the patient to prove an essentially negative fact. Thus,
under the Sard decision, the plaintiff is not required to prove what
prevailing medical practice would have been in his case.
III. THE ROLE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
The court of appeals's adoption of the materiality test for
determining the physician's disclosure duty and the resultant
allocation of the burden of production, "virtually dictates" 63 the role
of expert testimony in an informed consent case. Unlike those states
adhering to the professional standard,64 the plaintiff in Maryland is
not bound to produce expert evidence to prove that the defendant
violated prevailing medical practice by failing to inform his patient
of certain risks and treatment alternatives.6 5 Expert evidence will,
however, still play a crucial role in the successful presentation of the
plaintiffs case.
The plaintiff generally must present evidence establishing the
materiality of the withheld information to his consent.66 This burden
requires evidence demonstrating the nature of the risk inherent in
the particular treatment and the frequency of its occurrence.67 The
materiality of information necessarily involves consideration of both
the nature of its risk and its incidence. A minor risk, even though
occurring relatively frequently, may not be material in light of a
treatment's potential benefit.68 Conversely, materiality is generally
62. Requiring the physician to produce evidence justifying non-disclosure allows the
plaintiff to avoid the potential of confronting a "conspiracy of silence" within
the medical community. Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. Ct. 260, 267, 286 A.2d
647, 650 (1971).
63. 281 Md. at 446, 379 A.2d at 1023. See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 1084 (1973).
64. These states uniformly require expert testimony to establish the applicable
standard of care. See, e.g., Casey v. Penn, 45 Ill. App. 3d 573, 360 N.E.2d 93
(1977).
65. Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. at 447, 379 A.2d at 1024.
66. See, e.g., Beauvais v. Notre Dame Hospital, - RI -... 387 A.2d 689,
691-92 (1978). Unlike medical malpractice cases founded upon the negligent
administration of treatment, the plaintiff in an informed consent action cannot
rely on the common knowledge of jurors in order to establish materiality. Where
the risk is so commonly known that expert testimony would not be required to
establish materiality, the plaintiff can hardly claim that it was unknown to him.
Cf. Thomas v. Corso, 265 Md. 84, 97-99, 288 A.2d 379, 387-88 (1972) (medical
expert testimony may not be required where negligence is so obvious that
common knowledge or experience of jurors is sufficient for them to recognize
negligence from the facts).
67. Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. at 448, 379 A.2d at 1024. See generally Mason v.
Ellsworth, 3 Wash. App. 298, 310-14, 474 P.2d 909, 918-19 (1970).
68. Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 (1965), modified on other
grounds, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966). The patient suffered hemorrhaging
in his eye as a result of an operation for the removal of cataracts, an injury
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established where the risk is one of grave and permanent damage,
even though it occurs infrequently. 69 If the only risk is that the
particular treatment proposed may not succeed, the incidence of that
failure and its consequences must be established.70 Some treatments
may also involve risks that are collateral, rather than the mere risk
of failure. In those cases, the probability of those risks ultimately
materializing must be established by the plaintiff.71 Finally, the
existence of any nondisclosed alternative treatments, together with
their collateral dangers and risk of failure, must be demonstrated by
expert testimony.72 This evidence concerning collateral risks,
probabilities of failure, and treatment alternatives is within the
exclusive domain of medical experts, but whether such expert
testimony presents a material fact is to be determined by the
"reasonable man" standard. 73
Expert testimony may also be vital to the successful defense of
an informed consent action. Whenever the exercise of appropriate
medical judgment is relied upon by the defendant to justify
nondisclosure, expert testimony is required to establish that, under
the prevailing professional practice, nondisclosure was warranted.7 4
Thus, expert evidence is required whenever the defendant seeks to
justify his withholding of material information on the grounds of its
harmful effect on the patient in order to establish the validity of
those medical considerations.7 5 Any of the other affirmative defenses
available to the defendant, for example, incapacity or emergency,
may also require expert evidence to establish the existence of
occurring in 2-25 percent of such operations. The court stated, "[t]he risks of
injury are not so great as to cause most reasonable persons to decline to have
such a beneficial operation performed, one that has such a good chance of
restoring the sight of a substantially nonfunctional eye to an eye capable of
20/20 vision without aid of a lens." Id. at 367, 409 P.2d at 83.
69. Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. Ct. 260, 263, 286 A.2d 647, 648 (1971) (.0004
percent risk of perforating the stomach during course of a gastroscopic
examination).
70. Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. at 448, 379 A.2d at 1024. See also Small v. Gifford
Memorial Hospital, 133 Vt. 552, 554, 349 A.2d 703, 705 (1975).
71. Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. at 448, 379 A.2d at 1024.
72. Id.
73. The court indicated that, upon remand, Mrs. Sard would be required to produce
expert testimony to show the nature of the various methods of sterilization or
birth control available in 1967, the nature of the specific operative procedures, if
any, employed to effect sterilization by a particular method, the respective failure
rates for each of the methods and procedures, both when performed at the time of
Caesarean section and at other times, and the risk of harm to mother and child
inherent in each available method or procedure. Id. See also Small v. Gifford
Memorial Hospital, 133 Vt. at 554-55, 349 A.2d at 705.
74. Only medical experts can determine the validity of the physician's concern for
the harmful effect disclosure might have on a patient or the incompetency of a
patient to evaluate material information. "When medical judgment enters the
picture and for that reason the special standard [of care] controls, prevailing
medical practice must be given its just due." Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,
785 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
75. Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. at 448, 379 A.2d at 1024.
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medical considerations that foreclosed full disclosure. Proof of such
compliance will not be conclusive under the Sard materiality test, as
"it is still for the jury to decide whether adherence to the professional
standard deprived the patient of his right of self-determination. '76
IV. CAUSATION
In an informed consent action, the plaintiff must establish
proximate cause between the defendant's nondisclosure of material
information and the harm ultimately suffered by proving that "the
reasonable man" would not have given his consent to the proposed
treatment had a full and adequate disclosure been made at the time
consent was originally given.77 As the Sard court noted, there is still
the question of whether causation should be judged by a purely
subjective test - what the patient himself would have done had full
disclosure been made, or an objective test - what a reasonable
person in the patient's position would have done had he been fully
informed. 78
The subjective test is a distinct minority view.79 A purely
hypothetical test that ultimately turns on the credibility of a patient
seeking to recover after suffering a most undesirable result puts the
physician in jeopardy of the patient's hindsight and bitterness80
Thus, the court of appeals aligned itself with the majority of
jurisdictions which view causation objectively.81 Under the objective
test, the crucial inquiry is whether a reasonable person in the
patient's position would have withheld consent to the surgery or
treatment had all material risks been disclosed . 2 The plaintiff's
hindsight testimony as to what he would have done may be relevant,
but it is not required nor is it dispositive of the causation issue.83
Few states have addressed in any detail the causation problems
which may arise when the plaintiff is not reasonable. For example,
76. Id. at 445, 379 A.2d at 1023.
77. Id. at 448-49, 379 A.2d at 1024 (citing Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 628-29,
295 A.2d 676, 690 (1972)); Beauvais v. Notre Dame Hospital, - R.I. -,
387 A.2d 689, 692 (1978). This is really little more than an application of the "but
for" rule, which comes as close to the essence of proximate cause as any concept.
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 432 (1965).
78. Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. at 449, 379 A.2d at 1024-25.
79. Even those courts that deny recovery where the plaintiff fails to testify that he
would have refused the treatment had full disclosure been made often make
reference to the course of action to be expected of a reasonable person. See
Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. at 369, 409 P.2d at 83.
80. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 790-91.
81. The court of special appeals intimated that Mrs. Sard's failure to testify that she
would have refused the tubal ligation had all material risks been disclosed might
have served as an alternative basis for upholding the directed verdict. Sard v.
Hardy, 34 Md. App. at 234-35, 367 A.2d at 535.
82. Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. at 450, 379 A.2d at 1025.
83. Id. For a similar analysis of the limited effect to be given the plaintiffs hindsight




although adopting the objective test for causation, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin recognized that a jury could find that a
reasonable man, when apprised of the material risks involved, would
have consented to the treatment even though the plaintiff would not
have consented.8 4 In such a case, the plaintiff is denied recovery
under the objective test, notwithstanding the fact that the personal
interest of the plaintiff's right to self-determination was infringed.
The Wisconsin court held, however, that the objective test is on
balance more fair in that while a jury may take the plaintiff's
subjective feelings into account, it is not limited solely by that
consideration.8 5
A more difficult problem is presented when a reasonable person
in the patient's position would have refused the treatment had full
disclosure been made, but the particular plaintiff would have
consented nonetheless.8 6 Presumably, under the objective standard,
the causation requirement would be satisfied even though that
patient's consent was not affected by his lack of information. The
thrust of the objective standard is what the "reasonable man" would
consent to in the same or similar circumstances; thus, under any
circumstances, the defendant's burden of proof remains the same.8 7
As a practical matter, the plaintiff should testify in all informed
consent cases that he would have refused the treatment had there
been a complete disclosure of risks. Such testimony will still be
relevant to the ultimate -resolution of the causation issue under the
objective test recognized by the court of appeals.88 The defendant
should be prepared to produce evidence indicating that a reasonable
person would have consented to the therapy, given the potential
benefits, even had all risks and alternatives been fully explained.
V. CONCLUSION
The court of appeals in Sard adopted a modern viewpoint of
informed consent that attempts to balance the interests of both
patient and physician. By defining the physician's duty to disclose
84. Scaria v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 14-15, 227 N.W.2d 647,
654-55 (1975).
85. Id.
86. The defendant may be able to demonstrate, for example, that the plaintiff has in
the past submitted, after full disclosure, to operations with a greater risk and less
potential benefit than the treatment at issue.
87. The plaintiff will not, of course, be able to testify that he personally would have
refused the proposed treatment if the risk that ultimately materialized was death.
This has been one source of criticism against the subjective causation test, as a
plaintiff who dies or becomes severely incapacitated is foreclosed from recovery.
Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668-76 (Mo. 1965).
The difficulty can be solved, however, by merely reallocating the burden of
proof for the causation issue. The plaintiff, by demonstrating that a reasonable
man would have refused the treatment, creates a presumption that he too would
have personally withheld his consent.
88. Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. at 450, 379 A.2d at 1025.
128 [Vol. 8'
Sard v. Hardy
information in terms of its materiality to the patient, the patient's
right to self-determination is fully realized. The physician is allowed
to exercise some discretion in withholding material information
when the medical considerations involved are important enough to
override the patient's right to be informed. By adopting the objective
test for determining causation, the court also strives to protect the
physician from the hindsight credibility of his patient. The Sard
decision is nonetheless a boon to the patient, and the medical
community will certainly take small comfort from the court's limited
concession to the exercise of medical expertise.
The express recognition of the informed consent doctrine in
Maryland may result in a proliferation of medical malpractice cases,
since the cause of action is completely independent from one based
on negligence.8 9 Conversely, a fully informed patient may well
hesitate to undertake purely elective surgery, thereby resulting in a
decrease of such treatments and a reduction in the incidence of
malpractice claims.9° In any event, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland has given express recognition to Justice Cardozo's oft-
quoted statement that "[e]very human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body." 91
John R. Penhallegon
89. It still remains to be seen whether Maryland's rejection of the "locality rule" in
traditional malpractice actions, wherein the plaintiff was required to establish
the professional standard of care in the defendant-physician's own community,
Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hospital, 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975), will
cause an increase in malpractice litigation.
90. Myers, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1396, 1418
(1967).
91. Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. at 439, 379 A.2d at 1019 (quoting Schloendorff v. Society
of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)).
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